

RESUMÉ

Des chercheurs ont affirmé, après les élections politiques de 1979, que l'abstention a représenté un nouveau protagoniste politique. Ils ont soutenu cette thèse parce que ils avaient dit, avant 1979, que dans les élections de 1948 à 1976 la pourcentage de non-votants était physiologique.

L'hypothèse que l'abstention est toujours une forme d'expression politique est à l'origine de cette recherche. La technique statistique utilisé est la comparaison des coefficients de regression (les quels sont plus précis si nous avons un grand nombre de données) avec le $b=0$ coefficient de regression.

Dans le but de confirmer ou d'infirmer cette hypothèse j'ai étudié la province de Brescia où il y a des nombreuses communes et un petit nombre d'abstentionnistes (ce petit nombre augmente la possibilité de fausser mon hypothèse).

J'ai pu vérifier que chaque aire politique (gauche, c'est-à-dire PCI et PSI; droite, c'est-à-dire PLI et MSI; centre, c'est-à-dire DC e PSDI) present différentes formes de fluctuation de votants à non-votants (et vice-versa).

ALLOCATION OF INVESTMENTS AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR IN THE ITALIAN SOUTH

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ABSTRACT

Before 1979 some researches stated abstentionism in the elections from 1948 to 1976 to be at a « physiological » level. After the political elections of 1979, they claimed abstentionists were the « new » protagonists of the italian political life.

This ecological research was originated by the hypothesis that « physiological » abstention has never been relevant in Italy and that a fluctuant « political » abstention has always been present from 1948 to 1976. The comparison of empirical regression coefficients (which are more exact if computed on a large number of cases) with the $b=0$ regression coefficient is a statistical technique largely used in this research.

Just to demonstrate the fluctuation of votes from abstentionism to the parties (and viceversa) I have studied the district of Brescia where we have a little abstention (which makes my hypothesis more likely to be falsificated) and a large number of communes (a good condition to have exact regressions).

Collected data show that every different political area (the left, i.e. PCI and PSI, the right, i.e. PLI and MSI; and the center, i.e. DC and PSDI) in this district have different types of fluctuation from abstention and towards it.

The Italian South is comprised of the eight regions of Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily, and Sardinia. This area contains 43% of the national territory and 34% (1971) of the population of Italy. With respect to numerous conventional indicators of regional disequilibrium — migration, income per capita, unemployment — the South lags noticeably behind the rest of the country. In a recent study comparing the south with the rest of the country on twenty-one economic indicators, the southern regions ranked considerably below the national average on all 21 indicators⁽¹⁾.

The disparity of economic well-being between the Italian South and the rest of the country is no new phenomenon. The southern problem or « Southern Question » as it is sometimes referred to, is a long standing concern in Italy. Given the enduring roots of this problem, it is not surprising that in the years which followed World War II and the establishment of a republican form of government in Italy, the perennial problem of the South would once again come to the fore.

The present study examines the impact of the Italian Government's policy of industrial development and investment allocation in southern Italy over the last twenty-five years. The main vehicle for investment outlays in the region was a newly created agency, *The Cassa per il Mezzogiorno* (Fund for the South), hereafter referred to as the Cassa.

1. *The Cassa per il Mezzogiorno and the localization of industrial investments*

The creation of the Cassa in 1950 represents a major watershed for southern development policy. The main criticism of earlier attempts to develop the Italian South was that they had been too fragmented, uncoordinated, and lacked a proper sense of direction. Furthermore, and perhaps more important, funds allocated were not sufficient to tackle adequately the problem at hand. With the creation of the Cassa it was hoped that many of these difficulties and shortcomings would be overcome and that the Cassa would be in a position to formulate and administer a coordinated and organic plan for the development of southern Italy.

⁽¹⁾ SVIMEZ, *Dinamica socio-economica delle regioni del Mezzogiorno nel periodo 1951-1971 in confronto alla media nazionale* (Rome: Failli, 1972).

TABLE 1 - Sectoral Division of Cassa per il Mezzogiorno's Funds Allocations 1950-1970.

Sector	1950-65		1966-70		1971	
		%		%		%
Infrastructure	571 *	27.5	390	27.5	151	21.8
Industry	245	11.8	943	27.5	275	39.9
Agriculture	1,150	55.4	310	16.7	137	19.8
Tourism	57	2.7	29	1.6	29	2.9
Handicrafts - Fisheries	10	0.4	47	2.4	5	0.9
Other	37	2.2	141	7.6	102	14.8
Total	2,069	100.0	1,860	100.0	691	100.0

* In billions of lire.

Source: Comitato dei Ministri per il Mezzogiorno, *Piano di coordinamento degli interventi pubblici nel Mezzogiorno* (Roma, Failli, 1966), pp. 57-62.
Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, *Bilancio 1971* (Roma, Failli, 1972), pp. 3-5.

The present study is based upon one underlying assumption that noneconomic considerations played an important role in the localization of industrial investments in southern Italy. More specifically, it is hypothesized that political considerations (i.e. electoral competition between the DC which has controlled the government since 1947 and the PCI, the second largest party) influenced the government's investment program (*).

There is no doubt that the creation of the Cassa in 1950 was at least partially conditioned by the political situation in the immediate post-war period. The DC's electoral victory of 1948 was followed in 1949 by a wave of strikes and invasions of the land. The latter phenomenon had

also in the likelihood that the companies which had received funds were actually functioning (i.e., engaged in productive activity), the Cassa provided us with two figures for total investments. One figure indicated those companies which had received at least 90 percent of their projected allocation and a second figure listing those companies which had received funds but whose total did not yet amount to 90 percent of their projected investment.

The figures for total investments, therefore, include all those companies which received 90 percent or more as well as several companies (usually large installations such as Alfa Romeo, which had received approximately 60 percent of its total allocated investment) whose investment allocations did not amount to 90 percent but which were nevertheless engaged in productive activities. The figures used, therefore, are conservative, but we believe that they reflect the industrial realities in the South. That is we believe that the figures reflect those companies which were actually engaged in productive activities and not just half finished or abandoned starts. Furthermore, since the 1951-1961 investment figures were provided by SVIMEZ while the 1961-1971 data was provided by the Cassa. Clearly an investigation of « who go twbat » in Italy must necessarily go beyond an examination of budgetary allocations. This is why data for industrial used in the present study reflect actual expenditures rather than projected allocations.

(*) As a corollary we also investigated the widely held belief that DC strongholds (cities returning over 50% of the vote to the DC) also received token funds - more as political payoffs to party notables than for their economic potential.

The Cassa was initially given a 10 year mandate (1950-1960) and endowed with 1,000 billion lire (approximately 1.6 billion dollars) to carry out its program. The direction of the Cassa's spending as reflected by its first 10 year plan was basically non-industrial, with most of its efforts going into agriculture and infrastructure (primarily water supplies and drainage). As early as 1952 there was a reorganization of the Cassa's proposed expenditure. In that year, its mandate was extended until 1962 and its funds were increased to 1,280 billion lire. The priorities and direction of spending were modified slightly. The so-called Twelve Year Plan of 1952 increased the percentage of funds allocated for infrastructure and decreased allocations for agriculture. The exclusion of industry during this period was conditioned in part by the belief that industry would move into the South automatically once the right environment had been created. Infrastructure, particularly improvements in transportation and communication, was considered to be the major ingredient for such an environment. However, by the mid 1950's any hope that large-scale industrial development would take place spontaneously in the South were declared grossly optimistic and generally incorrect. There were few reasons why northern industry should consider a southern location and indeed very important reasons why it would be reluctant to move to the South. In order to encourage industrial development, it became clear that more positive measures would be needed.

In 1957 the government responded with the passage of law No. 634 (sometimes referred to as the Industrial Areas Law) which authorized the Cassa to support the establishment of industrial zones and general industrial development in southern Italy.

The underlying goal of this law was rapid industrialization based on location concentration. Therefore, Cassa was directed to encourage growth poles called *areas of industrial development* when population exceeded 200 thousand and *nuclei* when population did not reach that number. The passage of Law No. 634 in addition to extending the life of the Cassa until 1965, clearly increased the importance of industry as part of the Cassa's development effort⁽²⁾. An examination of Table 1 indicates an appreciable increase in industrial expenditures.

But the allocation of resources in Italy more often than not had little to do with actual expenditures. In many cases funds have been allocated for technical, and more often political reasons, but have never been expended⁽³⁾.

(2) In addition to extending the life of the Cassa to 1965, Law No. 634 provided for 1) fiscal and financial incentives for industrial localization in the South; 2) obligatory investment by state-controlled firms in the South, and 3) geographical concentration of investments in specifically designated growth areas. See legge 20 luglio 1957 N. 634 in SVIMEZ, *Le leggi per il Mezzogiorno* (Roma: Failli, 1957), pp. 4365-4381.

(3) Once approved, the actual financing of a projected industry or enterprise by the Cassa is a complicated and often drawn out procedure. To begin with, funds are allocated on the basis of a graduated installment plan which roughly coincides with phases of completion. Since we were interested not only in funds actually allocated but

its center in the southern regions, mainly Sicily, Apulia, and Calabria. It was feared that the PCI was behind much of the protest and would try to provoke even more militant action. To be sure, the South offered very good material for such action, with its vast army of peasants, laborers, unemployed intellectuals, and underemployed city proletariat. Under these conditions, especially when considered in the context of the widespread « red scare » which characterized the post-war atmosphere in all western countries, it is not surprising that the socioeconomic development of southern Italy became a key concern among government leaders. In retrospect it appears that the Italian government, strongly influenced by foreign advisors, over-reacted to the fear of an imminent takeover by the PCI.

Even by 1977 the Carter Administration admonished against communist participation in the Italian government, yet by March 1978 the PCI finally were accepted as part of the governing parliamentary majority in Italy, even though they do not control any Ministry⁽⁵⁾.

2. Relationship of local electoral behavior and spacial distribution of public investment outlays

This study attempts to assess the relationship of local electoral behavior and spacial distribution of public investment outlays. A random sample of 534 southern Italian communes has been selected for examination. Approximately one half of these communes are part of development areas or nuclei created after 1957 while the remaining are not⁽⁶⁾. The analysis

(5) Note that as a result of the 1976 elections the DC and PCI together controlled 73.1% of the votes in Parliament and therefore there is no effective opposition.

(6) The selection of communes for inclusion in the present study was based on a modified random sample. The actual sample size was determined by use of the following formula:

$$n = \frac{4 \times P \times Q \times N}{E^2 (N-1) + PQ}$$

n = sample size

N = size of universe

P = percentage with which phenomenon occurs

Q = 100-P; percentage with which phenomenon is not likely to occur

For the purposes of the present study a 5 percent margin of error was used, while the total universe of communes was based on the 1961 figure. Inserting these values into the equation, the sample size was found to be 384. However the sample size actually employed was 534. This figure was derived by including in the sample all Southern communes which had a population of over 20,000. There were a total of 155 communes in 1961 with a population greater than 20,000. The rationale for this inclusion and hence the deviation from a true random sample was that one of the prerequisites for the delineation of growth areas was population size.

is based on the relationship between aggregate electoral returns for each commune and industrial investment channelled, subsidized, and financed by the Cassa⁽⁷⁾. Tables 5 through 9 and 12 report these relationships in percentage form for electoral results.

The major assumptions upon which this study is based is that industrial investments allocated to those communes manifested a high degree of electoral competition between Italy's two major parties, the DC and the PCI. Table 2 reveals that in none of the investment categories (high, medium and low) is there an increase in voting for the DC. On the other

TABLE 2 - Industrial Investments and Electoral Behavior in Southern Italy by Commune and Amount of Investment 1951-1961.

Elections National	No Investments						Investments					
	DC		PCI		MSI		DC		PCI		MSI	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
1953	45	17	7	7	38	23	8	9				
1958	54	17	4	9	45	23	6	11				
1963	51	19	5	10	42	26	7	11				
1968	50	18	4	16	43	25	6	13				
1972	52	18	8	10	42	25	12	9				
M =	50.4	17.8	5.6	10.4	42.0	24.4	7.8	8.4				
	N = 237						N = 274					

Elections National	Low (0-100 million L)						Medium (100-2500 million L)						High (over 2500 million L)					
	DC		PCI		MSI		DC		PCI		MSI		DC		PCI		MSI	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
1953	41	23	7	7	37	22	8	9	34	24	10	8						
1958	48	22	5	11	43	24	6	11	39	24	7	11						
1963	44	26	6	10	41	26	7	11	39	25	7	10						
1968	44	25	4	14	42	26	7	12	38	24	7	13						
1972	45	25	9	10	41	25	13	8	36	24	16	10						
M =	44.4	24.2	6.2	10.6	40.8	24.6	8.2	10.2	37.2	24.2	9.4	10.4						
	N = 117						N = 135						N = 22					

(7) The Cassa, in addition to giving capital grants from its own fund, also acts as a clearing agency in screening applications from firms wishing to erect or expand industrial establishments in the South. Thus, when we refer to industrial investments we are not, strictly speaking, referring to only those funds directly expended by the Cassa but rather the sum total of all investments funnelled through the Cassa which include: government insured loans, tax credits, social security credits. For an in-depth clarification of the categories used see SVIMEZ, *Gli investimenti industriali agevolati nel Mezzogiorno 1951-1968*. (Roma: Failli, 1971).

hand, the PCI seems to have been more successful — either holding its own or in most cases gaining one or more percentage points⁽⁸⁾. It appears that those communes receiving the highest investments do not manifest the highest support for the DC. These findings — despite widescale allegations that DC strongholds received the bulk of the funds — tends to support the more rational contention that safe cities, states, and/or provinces are the least likely to become recipients of large scale economic rewards since there is no political reason to waste scarce resources on cities where the party in power is clearly and undeniably in command.

Table 3, which represents the investment period 1961-71, indicates that those communes which received high (i.e. over 2500 million lire) investments exhibited the lowest average vote for the DC for each of the national elections from 1958 to 1972. Conversely, the only increase in DC

vote between 1968 and 1972 was found within the « no investment » category. It may be interesting to note, however, that while electoral support for the PCI remained stable within those communes which received high investments (25% for all elections from 1963) support for the PCI declined between 1968 and 1972 in the medium investment category. Undoubtedly the fact that the DC has been in power continuously since 1945, coupled with recurring incidents of corruption and mismanagement within the Cassa, has not enhanced its electoral potential irrespective of the fact that at least a measure of real socio-economic change must be attributed to the government-sponsored development program.

The fact that a large number of communes received investments and were not included within growth areas clearly indicates that the inclusion of a commune within a growth area was not a strict pre-condition or even stimulus for the localization of industrial investments (although in terms of total expenditures communes within growth areas did, in fact, receive a higher proportion of the total investments). Was there perhaps a difference with respect to electoral behavior between communes which were included in growth areas as opposed to those which were not?

Tables 4 and 5 contrast the findings between those communes which received investments and were part of growth areas and those which received investments but were not included in growth areas. Since the findings for both periods are essentially similar a detailed discussion will be limited to the 1961-71 period. The findings suggest that:

- 1) DC vote is *higher* within all investment categories *outside* growth areas, while;
- 2) PCI vote is *lower* within all investment categories *outside* growth areas.

One exception is evidenced. Communes which received medium investments (101 - 2500 million lire) but were *outside* growth areas demonstrated higher electoral support for the PCI than those communes within growth areas. This was particularly noticeable when examining the election of 1963 (28 percent and 25 percent respectively). However, by the election of 1972, PCI support had declined to 26 percent for those communes outside growth areas, whereas it remained stable at 25 percent for those communes included within growth areas. The fact that so many communes outside growth areas received investments clearly negates the Cassa's intended policy of industrial concentration. This would not be so unusual if those communes outside growth areas had the same political configuration as those within growth areas. However, this is not the case.

Communes outside growth areas which received investments supported the DC to a much higher extent than did those communes within growth areas. In a similar vein the PCI received a consistently lower proportion of the vote outside growth areas (with only one exception - communes within the medium investment category).

Based upon these findings it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that

TABLE 3 - Industrial Investments and Electoral Behavior in Southern Italy by Commune and Amount of Investment 1961-1971.

Elections National	No Investments						Investments					
	DC			PSI			DC			PSI		
	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI
1953	44	18	7	7	38	23	8	9				
1958	54	17	4	10	44	23	6	11				
1963	51	19	4	10	42	26	7	11				
1968	50	18	3	15	43	25	6	13				
1972	51	18	8	10	42	25	12	9				
M =	50.0	18.0	5.2	10.4	41.8	24.4	7.8	10.6				
	N = 249						N = 264					
							High (over 2500 million L)					
	Low (0-100 million L)			Medium (101-2500 million L)			DC			PSI		
	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI
1953	43	20	7	38	23	8	9	35	23	8	10	
1958	52	21	5	8	44	23	6	11	41	24	7	12
1963	47	24	6	8	41	27	7	11	39	25	7	11
1968	47	22	5	14	42	26	6	13	41	25	7	13
1972	47	22	9	10	41	26	11	9	39	25	14	9
M =	47.2	21.8	6.4	9.4	41.2	24.4	7.6	10.6	39.0	24.4	8.6	11.0
	N = 49						N = 132					
							N = 83					

(8) According to Table 5 the Italian Social Movement (MSI) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), representing between 4 and 16 percent of the vote, historically have not been a threat to the major parties, DC and PCI.

TABLE 4 - Industrial Investments and Electoral Behavior in Southern Italy by Commune and Amount of Investment for Communes Not Included Within Growth Areas 1961-1971.

National Elections	No Investments						Investments					
	DC			PSI			DC			PSI		
	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI
1953	45	17	7	8	40	23	7	8				
1958	54	17	4	10	47	22	6	10				
1963	51	19	4	10	44	26	6	10				
1968	51	18	3	16	44	24	5	13				
1972	52	18	7	10	44	24	10	10				
M =	50.6	17.8	5.0	10.8	43.8	23.8	6.8	10.2				
	N = 221											

National Elections	Low (0-100 million L)						Medium (101-2500 million L)						High (over 2500 million L)											
	DC			PSI			DC			PSI			DC			PSI								
	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI						
1953	44	19	7	7	39	25	7	8	35	23	8	9												
1958	53	19	5	8	45	24	6	11	43	21	6	13												
1963	48	22	6	8	42	28	6	10	44	23	6	11												
1968	47	20	5	14	43	27	5	13	43	24	6	13												
1972	48	21	10	10	42	26	10	10	44	23	11	10												
M =	48.0	20.2	6.6	9.4	42.4	26.6	6.8	10.4	41.8	22.8	7.4	11.2												
	N = 40												N = 68						N = 19					

TABLE 5 - Industrial Investments and Electoral Behavior in Southern Italy by Commune and Amount of Investment for Communes Included Within Growth Areas 1961-1971.

National Elections	No Investments						Investments											
	DC			PSI			DC			PSI								
	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI						
1953	41	20	7	5	37	23	8	10										
1958	52	19	5	9	42	24	6	12										
1963	48	21	6	10	39	26	7	12										
1968	46	20	4	13	41	26	7	12										
1972	47	20	11	9	40	26	13	9										
M =	46.8	20.0	6.6	9.2	39.8	25.0	8.2	11.0										
	N = 28												N = 37					

National Elections	Low (0-100 million L)						Medium (101-2500 million L)						High (over 2500 million L)					
	DC			PSI			DC			PSI			DC			PSI		
	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI	%	PCI	MSI
1953	42	26	6	9	38	22	8	9	34	23	9	10						
1958	47	28	6	11	44	23	6	12	40	25	7	12						
1963	44	33	6	10	40	25	7	13	38	26	8	11						
1968	45	32	4	11	42	25	6	12	40	26	7	13						
1972	43	31	7	10	40	25	12	9	38	25	15	9						
M =	44.2	30.0	5.8	10.2	40.8	24.4	7.8	11.0	38.0	25.0	9.2	11.0						
	N = 9						N = 64						N = 64					

political considerations were of importance in the allocation of funds outside growth areas. That is to say the Cassa appears to have gone out of its way to approve the disbursement of investments outside growth areas to communes which had an added feature — a proportionally higher vote for the DC than communes found within growth areas.

3. Investments in capital intensive sector or in labor intensive sector

Undoubtedly an important factor in the industrial development of any region is the localization of industries which are compatible with the regional and/or local environment. That is to say, the predominantly agricultural nature of the Italian South coupled with its abundance of unskilled labor was eminently more suited to the localization of small and medium sized industries which could provide necessary linkages between local sources of supply and demand. Unfortunately, the Italian government was reluctant during the 1950's to interfere too much with the natural course of industrial development. As one government apologist remarked, Italy was still in a period of reconstruction during the 1950's such that high levels of competitiveness were necessary if the balance of payment was to be improved.

This line of reasoning seems to have permeated the Cassa's development efforts. In fact, among the many criticisms levied against the Cassa was its tendency to concentrate or favor investments in capital intensive industries. In most cases these investments were poured into such industries as petroleum, chemicals, and steel. These industries, in contrast to such labor intensive industries as automotive assembly or food processing, do not employ a large number of workers relative to the initial investment. Thus critics of the Cassa charged that it was not dealing with the problem of unemployment and underemployment in the South — a problem which many claim is the crux of the « Southern Question ».

The relationship between the volume of the investment and expanding employment was clearly dependent upon the nature of the facility supported. Centers with highly capital intensive industries, as for example Taranto with its modern steel facility or Brindisi and Gela with their massive petro-chemical complexes are all notable examples of industries in which the number of new jobs created was relatively low compared with the total investment. In contrast, centers like Bari, Catania, and Palermo acquired a number of new industries which are by comparison labor intensive in nature (e.g., large scale food processing, synthetic fibers, paper processing plants).

The need for unskilled jobs in the South increased between 1951 and 1977 as evidenced by the fact that over 4 million people left, putatively in search of jobs in the more industrialized cities of northern Italy and Europe. It has been suggested that if jobs had been available in the South such a mass exodus could have been averted. Admittedly, over-population is often cited as a problem in the South. However, this new and recent exodus constitutes that segment of the population which the South can least afford to lose (i.e., males between the ages of 15 and 35 with at least an elementary to intermediate education). In light of the preceding discussion it is important to know not only where industrial investments were localized but also in which sector (capital vs. labor) they were concentrated.

It is important to note that many communes, especially those which received medium to high investments, did not receive investments exclusively in one sector. On the contrary, such communes generally received investments in both sectors. Proceeding in a logical manner, we will first examine those communes which received investments in *only one* (capital intensive only or labor intensive only) sector followed by an investigation of those communes which received investments in both sectors.

Table 6 compares the electoral results for those communes which received investments in only one sector. An examination of these findings should provide an approximate indication of the Cassa's commitment to the expansion of employment creating opportunities in the South. There were only 15 communes which received investments in the « capital intensive only » group as compared to 125 which received investments in the « labor intensive only » group.

Higher votes prevail for the DC within the « labor intensive only » sector across all investment categories as compared with the « capital intensive only » sector. Support for the PCI, on the other hand, is considerably higher within the latter sector in contrast to the former. Within the « capital intensive only » sector the DC vote beginning with the election of 1958 has declined progressively from a high of 45 percent (1958) to a low of 37 percent (1972); this has been met with a corresponding increase

TABLE 6A - Communes Receiving Investments 1961-71 - Capital Intensive Sector Only.

Year	Total Investments			Medium (101-250 million L)			High (over 250 million L)		
	DC	PCI	PSI	DC	PCI	PSI	DC	PCI	PSI
1953	39	29	9	39	26	10	39	31	8
1958	45	27	6	47	26	8	43	29	7
1963	41	28	6	38	28	6	36	29	6
1968	39	30	5	40	30	5	41	30	6
1972	37	31	10	39	31	9	39	32	9
M =	40.2	29.0	7.2	40.6	28.2	7.4	39.6	30.2	6.8
	N = 9			N = 15			N = 6		

TABLE 6B - Communes Receiving Investments 1961-71 - Labor Intensive Sector Only.

Year	Total Investments			Low (0-100 million L)			Medium (101-250 million L)			High (over 250 million L)		
	DC	PCI	PSI	DC	PCI	PSI	DC	PCI	PSI	DC	PCI	PSI
1953	40	22	8	43	20	7	39	23	8	43	20	9
1958	47	22	5	51	21	5	45	23	5	45	21	7
1963	44	25	6	48	28	6	42	26	6	47	22	6
1968	44	25	5	48	21	5	42	27	5	47	22	6
1972	44	24	11	48	21	10	42	26	11	46	21	12
M =	43.8	23.6	7.0	47.6	21.4	6.6	42.0	25.0	7.0	43.4	21.2	8.0
	N = 125			N = 40			N = 77			N = 8		

in support for the PCI from 27 percent (1958) to 31 percent (1972). An investigation of the differences between investments in the « labor intensive only » sector points out that those communes within the high and low investment categories supported the DC to a much higher extent than did those within the medium investment category. Correspondingly, support for the PCI is highest within this latter category. The PCI received 26-27 percent of the vote for each of the three national elections from 1963 to 1972. By contrast within the high and low investment categories its share of the vote fluctuated between 21-24 percent for the same three elections.

The localization of high investments within the « labor intensive only » sector may well have led to an increase in the DC vote. The DC received 43 percent of the vote in the 1958 election but increased its support to 45 percent (1963) and 47 percent (1968). This can be contrasted with the fact that between 1958 and 1972 the DC declined in electoral support within the low and medium categories.

On the basis of these findings it may be concluded that the Cassa did indeed emphasize investments within the labor intensive sector. On the other hand, the findings may also be interpreted to substantiate numerous allegations that the Cassa's almost indiscriminant approval of low (1-100

million lire) investments was primarily a ploy to dole out patronage to local party notables^(*).

Few would deny that at least some of the Cassa's industrial investments were poorly localized or that some misuse of funds did in fact take place. The point in question is the extent to which there was an increase in industrial employment within those communes which received investments in the « labor intensive only » sector as compared to those which received investments in the « capital intensive only » sector.

Tables 7 and 8 examine the over-time (1951-1961-1971) changes in the occupational structure of the communes within the two above mentioned sectors. A glance at the findings suggests that: 1) the increases in industrial employment between 1951 and 1971 do not appear to be notable; and 2) the increases (10 percent to 13 percent — labor intensive only and 10 percent to 14 percent — capital intensive only) are essentially similar for both sectors. Although there is a decline in population engaged in agriculture during the period in question, this is largely due to the initial surplus of workers in agriculture. An examination of the findings across investment categories indicates that notable increases in industrial employment are found within the high investment category. This situation is also supported by the increase in the number of industrial workers per unit within both sectors. It is curious, however, that those communes within the « labor intensive only » sector retain a relatively large proportion of their population in agriculture (35 percent in 1971) as compared to 17 percent in the « capital intensive » only sector. This suggests that the investments were localized in small sparsely populated and still predominantly agricultural communes.

Although there was a relatively large number of communes which received industrial investments in only one sector (140) there was an equally large number of communes (124) which obtained investments in both sectors. Eighty-eight out of the total 124 communes were included within growth areas.

Table 9 points out that electoral patterns for communes which received investments in both sectors do not differ markedly from those for communes which received total investments in the high (over 2500 million lire) category. A comparison of electoral behavior between investment categories seems to substantiate and corroborate earlier findings that electoral support for the DC is proportionally lower in communes which received high industrial investments than in those which received low invest-

(*) In at least one well publicized case, investments granted for the creation of a tourist facility (i.e., hotel) were actually used for improvements on the private estate of a Southern notable. In a similar incident, investments for the expansion of a fishinf fleet were used to refurbish a private pleasure boat.

TABLE 7 - Occupation and Demographic Structure by Investment Category for Communes which Received Investments in Capital Intensive Sector Only 1961-71

	Total Investments			Medium Investments			High Investments		
	1951	1961	1971	1951	1961	1971	1951	1961	1971
Agriculture	53%	41%	29%	63%	51%	37%	39%	26%	17%
Industry	10%	11%	14%	9%	9%	11%	11%	15%	20%
Commerce	9%	12%	16%	7%	10%	14%	12%	16%	17%
Workers p/ Commercial Unit	2.00	1.93	1.87	1.89	1.78	1.67	2.17	6.50	278
Workers p/ Industrial Unit	3.40	4.60	4.73	2.78	3.33	3.00	4.33	2.17	326
Population Density	260	291	305	248	267	266	2.17	7.33	362
Population Increase	18%	13%		15%	14%		20%	21%	
Reproductive Rate	12.84	11.06		12.50	10.93		13.35	11.24	
	N = 15			N = 9			N = 6		

TABLE 8 - Occupation and Demographic Structure by Investment Category for Communes which Received Investments in Labor Intensive Sector Only 1961-71.

	Total Investments		Low Investments		Medium Investments		High Investments	
	1951	1971	1951	1971	1951	1971	1951	1971
Agriculture	64%	52%	73%	59%	60%	48%	46%	35%
Industry	10%	10%	8%	7%	10%	11%	17%	22%
Commerce	8%	11%	6%	9%	9%	11%	12%	15%
Workers p/Commercial Unit	2.02	1.92	1.75	2.61	2.13	3.68	2.25	5.25
Workers p/Industrial Unit	2.73	3.46	2.22	1.55	2.91	1.83	3.50	2.13
Population Density	313	341	1.72	2.50	2.00	3.61	2.13	6.50
Population	313	341	1.72	2.50	2.00	3.61	500	179
Population Increase	11%	11%	8%	5%	12%	13%	13%	11%
Reproductive Rate	13.20	11.29	12.45	9.89	13.72	12.10	12.01	10.55
	N = 125		N = 40		N = 8		N = 8	

TABLE 9 - Industrial Investments and Electoral Behavior for Communes which Received Investments in Both the Capital and Labor Intensive Sectors 1961-1971.

National Elections	No Investments						Investments							
	DC	PCI	MSI	PSI	DC	PSI	DC	PCI	MSI	PSI	DC	PCI	MSI	PSI
1953	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1958	44	18	7	7	36	23	8	10	10	10	10	8	10	10
1963	54	17	4	10	42	24	6	12	12	12	6	8	11	11
1968	50	18	3	15	41	25	7	13	13	13	7	7	13	9
1972	51	18	8	10	40	25	13	9	9	9	25	13	9	9
M =	50.0	18.0	5.4	10.4	39.8	24.6	8.4	11.0	11.0	11.0	24.6	8.4	11.0	11.0
	N = 249						N = 124							

	Low (0-100 million L)			Medium (100-250 million L)			High (over 250 million L)		
	DC	PCI	PSI	DC	PCI	PSI	DC	PCI	PSI
1953	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1958	49	24	6	36	25	7	9	34	22
1963	51	21	4	42	25	6	11	39	23
1968	45	27	7	38	28	8	11	39	24
1972	42	24	8	40	26	6	13	40	24
M =	46.4	24.6	6.8	39.2	26.0	7.8	10.4	37.8	23.2
	N = 7			N = 53			N = 28		

ments. Changes in industrial employment increased between 1951 and 1971. Table 10 illustrates that substantial increases in: 1) percent of the population engaged in industry, and 2) number of industrial workers per unit are evident across all categories, but especially the medium and high investment categories.

An examination of the occupational changes which occurred within this select group of communes reveals that all exhibited a drop in agricultural employment from 22 percent to 8 percent and a corresponding increase in industrial employment from 16 percent to 30 percent. At least one commune (Bari) registered an increase in industrial employment from 24 percent to 52 percent between 1951-71. To be sure, all of the communes must be considered major Southern centres prior to the institution of the Cassa's development efforts. Therefore, it would seem that irrespective of their political preferences, these communes would have been the recipients of the bulk of industrial investments localized in the South. Much

TABLE 10 - Occupation and Demographic Structure by Investment Category for Communes which Received Investments in Both Capital and Labor Intensive Sector 1961-1971.

	Total Population Group			No Investments		
	1951	1961	1971	1951	1961	1971
Agriculture	74%	60%	49%	40%	31%	22%
Industry	7%	7%	8%	15%	19%	26%
Commerce	5%	9%	12%	13%	18%	20%
Workers p/Commercial Unit	1.57	2.47	171	2.36%	6.18	895
Workers p/Industrial Unit	2.14	1.40	166	5.11	2.30	1050
Population						
Density	1.65	2.13	157	2.52	7.66	1242
Population Increase		8%	9%		15%	16%
Productive Rate		10.51	7.73		14.05	13.63
		N = 124			N = 249	

TABLE 10 - (Continued) Occupation and Demographic Structure by Investment Category for Communes which Received Investments in Both Capital and Labor Intensive Sector 1961-1971.

	Low (1-100 million L)			Medium (101-2500 million L)			High (over 2500 million L)		
	1951	1961	1971	1951	1961	1971	1951	1961	1971
Agriculture	74%	62%	49%	44%	36%	26%	23%	23%	9%
Industry	5%	7%	9%	14%	16%	20%	18%	24%	38%
Commerce	4%	8%	11%	11%	17%	20%	19%	27%	27%
Workers p/Commercial Unit	1.43	2.00	1.29	2.18	2.25	2.21	2.93	3.37	2.96
Workers p/Industrial Unit	1.57	2.14	2.57	3.61	4.69	5.06	5.79	8.63	12.21
Population									
Density				854	1061	1337	1535	1808	2134
Population Increase				15%	15%		18%	23%	
Productive Rate				13.65	13.14		14.06	14.25	
				N = 33			N = 28		

more interesting from the perspective of the present study are those communes which did not manifest clear signs and/or evidence of industrial potential and yet were granted industrial investments.

4. Concentration and dispersion of investments

Table 11 indicates that the vast majority of communes in both 1951-1961 (92%) and 1961-71 (70%) received investments totalling less than 2500 million lire. Few communes outside growth areas received investments exceeding 2500 million lire. Communes selected as growth areas received the bulk of their investment allocations in the medium to high category whereas communes outside growth areas received a majority of their investments in the low to medium category.

To summarize briefly, the findings indicate that there is indeed an inherent contradiction in the Cassa's efforts to encourage industrial development in Southern Italy. On the one hand, industrial investments were scattered throughout the South irrespective of whether a commune was or was not included within a growth area. These investments were on the whole limited — that is investments totalling less than 2500 million lire. At the same time, a relatively small number of communes received investments totaling over 2500 million lire. To be more specific, 22 or 8% of the communes in 1951-61 received 72.5% of the total investments for the entire period while 82 or 30% of the communes received 96.5% of total investments for the 1961-71 period.

A large number of communes received minimal or token investments while a much smaller number of communes, all of which were included within growth areas, received the lion's share of investments. Therefore, if one can speak of both concentration and dispersion at the same time, then this appears to be the policy adopted by the Cassa. This finding has a number of important consequences for the subsequent analysis, for it a majority of the communes in Southern Italy which received industrial investments received only minimal or token investments, then there is far less reason to believe that measurable socio-economic and/or political changes would be evident in those communes which received high investment (over 2500 million lire) should have experienced changes in occupational structure in addition to other measures of socio-economic well being. This assumption reinforces the need to go beyond the use of dichotomized categories in an analysis of the relationship between industrial investments and socio-economic and/or political change.

There is, however, an additional factor which has not been examined. One of the major criticisms of Cassa's investment policy was that it favored capital — versus labor — intensive industries. Excess population has long been a pressing problem in Southern Italy. As such, it was suggested by many that small to medium sized industries would have been more suitable in coming to grips with both the need for industrialization and the

even more pressing need for employment. However, the concentration of investments in ostensibly capital-intensive industries (high investments relative to employment) did little to alleviate the second, and according to many, the more urgent problem of employment. Massive industrial establishments employing predominantly skilled and technical staffs did not meet the need for increased employment. The phrase «cathedrals in the desert» graphically describes the relationship between these large industries and their southern surroundings. Table 12 represents total investments for 1951-61 and 1961-71 by economic sector. A comparison of total investments for 1961-71 reveals that 59% of the funds were localized in capital intensive industries compared with 41% labor intensive industries. However, when contrasted with the 1951-61 period (36% and 64% respectively) we find that total investments allocated to capital intensive industries nearly doubled. This finding, though needing further elaboration, suggests that little in the way of spillover should be expected from such investments.

5. Politics and economics

On the whole the government's efforts to bring about industrial development in southern Italy must be considered less than successful. After two decades of induced development the population employed in industry continued to lag behind agricultural employment. According to Table 13, Campania was the only southern region in 1975 in which industrial employment exceeded, albeit by little, agricultural employment. In addition, industry's contribution to the value added was less than 20% in all regions save Campania. This finding coupled with the extraordinarily high contribution of public and private services (60% in Campania, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna) lends further credence to the allegation that industrial concentration was relegated to capital-intensive industries which provided little in the way of spin-offs.

Operating principally through the Cassa, the Italian government established a pattern of «growth areas» in the South in order to promote the localization of industrial investments in those communes capable of self-sustained economic growth. In the Italian political environment, characterized by widespread cynicism, patron-client relations and general governmental inefficiency and waste, it is not surprising that the proliferation of growth areas and the equally large number of communes selected for inclusion in these areas soon led to a great deal of criticism and suspicion regarding the Cassa's program. Critics alleged that political considerations (i.e., the need to buy patronage and support) rather than rational socio-economic criteria were the prime determinants in the Christian Democratic-led government's selection of many local ties which were granted industrial investments.

An analysis of the findings suggest two kinds of implications: one methodological and the second, substantive. In the comparative study of

TABLE 11 - Industrial Investments in Sample of Southern Italian Communes (N=534). 1951-61 and 1961-71.

		Growth Area						No Growth Area					
Total		number of communes			investments total			number of communes			investments total		
1951-1961	No Investments*	28	5%	1,416	88	70.4%	2,550	6.9%	251	125	100%	3,966	(1.2%)
	Investments*	37	29.6%	62,036	21.7%	22,790	61.2%	136	136	84,826	(26.3%)	233,909	(71.5%)
	over 2500	20	90.0%	222,016	77.8%	2	9.1%	22	22	233,909	(71.5%)	322,701	100%
	Total Investments	143	50.5%	285,468	88.5%	37,233	11.5%	283	283	322,701	100%		
1961-1971	No Investments	29	11.1%	397	01%	1,753	2.5%	261	52	2,150	(.0006%)	3,559,555	100%
	Investments*	10	19.2%	68	49.3%	49,938	7.13%	138	52	113,007	(3.1747%)	3,444,398	(96.7648%)
	over 2500	64	77.1%	2,796,075	97.78%	70	50.7%	648,323	92.62%	83	700,014	19.67%	
	Total Investments	142	52.0%	2,859,541	80.33%	131	48.0%	700,014	19.67%	273	3,559,555	100%	
	Total N =	171	32.0%		363	68.0%		534	534	100%			

* In millions of lire.

TABLE 13 - Employment and Value Added by Region and Sector 1975.

Regions	Agriculture	Construction	Industry	Services	Public Admin.	Total
ABRUZZO	27,2	10,7	22,3	26,1	13,7	100,0
MOLISE	39,6	11,5	15,3	19,6	14,0	100,0
CAMPANIA	21,2	11,4	22,1	30,1	15,2	100,0
PUGLIA	33,3	9,4	18,7	25,6	13,0	100,0
BASILICATA	36,2	16,3	15,0	19,0	13,5	100,0
CALABRIA	28,3	18,5	10,5	25,7	17,0	100,0
SICILIA	25,5	12,5	16,1	30,3	15,6	100,0
SARDEGNA	19,4	12,8	16,4	31,1	20,3	100,0
SOUTH	26,6	12,2	18,1	27,9	15,2	100,0

	Value Added					
ABRUZZO	15,9	12,3	19,6	37,6	14,6	100,0
MOLISE	20,8	15,1	14,6	31,9	17,6	100,0
CAMPANIA	13,8	6,0	20,9	44,9	14,4	100,0
PUGLIA	19,6	10,7	18,9	36,5	14,3	100,0
BASILICATA	20,7	19,7	14,7	26,8	18,1	100,0
CALABRIA	20,5	13,3	8,9	38,7	18,6	100,0
SICILIA	16,0	9,9	15,3	42,2	16,6	100,0
SARDEGNA	11,9	10,7	18,8	40,5	18,1	100,0
SOUTH	16,4	10,0	17,4	40,4	15,8	100,0

Source: ISTAT, *Occupati presenti in Italia, 1951-75*; UNICICIA, *I conti economici regionali, 1975*.

state and urban policy less attention is given to the question of « who allocates » resources and more consideration is given to the question of « who benefits ». The prevailing assumption in policy research (at least in the United States) is that the interest of each municipality is autonomous and salient vis-a-vis the central government and that the socio-economic characteristics of each urban unit, when compared in the aggregate, will somehow contribute to the understanding and explanation of policy output across the cities in general. This assumption may not apply in countries where the central government plays a decisive role in the fiscal policy decisions of distributing national resources. The present study argues that more attention should be given to the composition and political orientation of the national government. In Italy, for example, even with the recent activation of the ordinary regional governments there is little reason to expect that much power will be transferred to these local units. As such, there is far greater reason to argue that in a more centralized and unitary

TABLE 12 - Industrial Investments in Southern Italy by Commune and Amount of Investment 1951-1961 and 1961-71.

	Capital Intensive Investments		Labor Intensive Investments		Total
	number of communes	total investments	number of communes	total investments	
1951-1961	No Investments*	443 82,9%	259 48,5%		
	Investments*	42 7,8%	126 23,5%	3,783 1,83%	
101 - 2500		40 7,6%	136 25,5%	70,607 34,24%	
	over 2500	9 1,7%	13 2,5%	131,835 63,93%	
Total N =	534	116,476 36,09%	275 51,5%	206,225 63,91%	534
1961-1971	No Investments	391 73,2%	276 51,7%		
	Investments*	34 6,4%	54 10,2%	1,790 1,2%	
101 - 2500		63 11,8%	144 26,9%	16,971 1,16%	
	over 2500	46 8,6%	60 11,2%	1,445,247 98,72%	
Total N =	534	2,095,553 58,87%	258 48,3%	1,464,008 41,13%	534
1951-1961	No Investments	251 46,6%			
	Investments*	125 23,5%	3,966 1,22%		
101 - 2500		136 25,5%	85,826 23,28%		
	over 2500	22 4,1%	233,909 72,78%		
Total N =	534	322,701 100%			534
1961-1971	No Investments	261 48,9%			
	Investments*	52 9,7%	2,150 0,6%		
101 - 2500		138 25,9%	113,007 3,17%		
	over 2500	83 15,5%	3,444,404 96,76%		
Total N =	534	3,559,561 100%			534

* In millions of lire.

system, where the central government is entrusted with the authority of allocating resources, more attention and focus should be given to the question of « who allocates » or « who decides » on the distributive policy.

The interplay of politics and economics is clearly the major substantive finding of the present study. The findings suggest that in the context of southern Italy economic factors played an important role in determining the localization of industrial investments within the development areas. Outside the development areas the findings are somewhat more tenuous. Although there is a positive relationship between investments and socioeconomic factors, it is not as strong as that within development areas. On the other hand political factors outside growth areas are more salient as explanatory factors.

SOMMARIO

Il saggio prende in esame gli effetti della politica industriale e dell'allocazione degli investimenti realizzata dai governi italiani nel Sud, prevalentemente attraverso la Cassa per il Mezzogiorno.

Dopo aver brevemente ricostruito la strategia della Cassa nelle varie fasi del suo operato, gli autori sostengono che nella localizzazione degli investimenti industriali nel Mezzogiorno hanno giocato un ruolo importante criteri di scelta non economici ma politici. Lo studio tenta allora di stabilire la relazione fra la distribuzione spaziale delle linee di intervento pubblico e il comportamento elettorale degli abitanti delle diverse zone.

È stato preso in considerazione un campione di 534 comuni, metà dei quali rientrano nelle aree di sviluppo o nei nuclei creati nel 1957 e metà ne sono esclusi. L'ipotesi è che la maggior parte degli investimenti siano stati allocati laddove maggiore era la competizione fra Dc e Pci.

Nel periodo 1951-61 nei comuni interessati dagli investimenti (di alto, medio o basso grado che fossero) non si registra un aumento del voto alla Dc. Al contrario è il Pci che sembra aver avuto, sia pure leggermente, più successo.

Nel periodo 1961-71 i comuni che hanno ricevuto il più alto tasso di investimenti registrano il più basso appoggio alla Dc. Al contrario i comuni che non hanno ricevuto investimenti sono stati quelli dove al voto alla Dc è più cresciuto (Tab. 2). L'appoggio elettorale al Pci rimane stabile nei comuni con i più alti investimenti e decresce nei comuni della categoria degli investimenti medi (Tab. 3).

Occorre però distinguere dagli altri i comuni che hanno ricevuto investimenti pur non essendo stati inclusi nelle aree di sviluppo. Le Tab. 4 e 5 mostrano la differenza fra comuni che hanno ricevuto investimenti e sono compresi nelle aree di sviluppo e comuni che hanno ugualmente ricevuto investimenti pur non essendo compresi nelle aree di sviluppo. I risultati della ricerca mostrano che: 1) il voto alla Dc è più alto in tutte le categorie dei comuni *non* compresi nelle aree; 2) il voto al Pci è più basso in tutti i comuni *non* compresi nelle aree. Una sola eccezione: i comuni che hanno ricevuto investimenti medi ma sono fuori delle aree hanno dato più appoggio al Pci dei loro omologhi dentro le aree.

Secondo gli autori questi dati dimostrano che la Cassa ha obbedito a criteri politici concedendo investimenti ai comuni collocati fuori delle aree per conservare un elettorato già fedele o per allargarlo.

Il confronto fra due tipi di investimento, quelli *capital intensive* e quelli *labor intensive*, dimostra poi come i secondi siano stati molto più abbondanti dei primi. Ebbene, il sostegno elettorale alla Dc è più alto nei comuni che hanno ricevuto interventi solo *labor intensive*, mentre più alto è il sostegno elettorale al Pci cresce, mentre diminuisce quello della Dc.

La Cassa ha favorito i comuni con investimenti *labor intensive* per venire incontro alla politica clientelare dei leader politici locali. Molto alti risultano infatti gli investimenti proprio nei comuni meno abitati e più agricoli, di tradizionale influenza democristiana.

Un numero altrettanto alto di comuni ha ottenuto investimenti di ambidue i tipi. Il voto alla Dc risulta più basso nei comuni che hanno ricevuto alti investimenti industriali rispetto ai comuni che hanno ricevuto bassi investimenti industriali.

~~Un altro aspetto della politica della Cassa è quello di essere caratterizzata al tempo stesso da concentrazione e da dispersione.~~ Da un lato, cioè, il flusso di investimenti è stato concentrato in pochi comuni delle aree (con la creazione delle « cattedrali nel deserto »), dall'altro è stato disperso in tanti comuni fuori delle aree. Le conseguenze sono state il mancato decollo di un'industria meridionale e il permanere di alti tassi di disoccupazione. Il fatto è, ancora una volta, che nella distribuzione delle risorse hanno prevalso sui criteri di razionalità economica considerazioni di ordine politico-clientelare.

Lo studio conclude con una considerazione metodologica e una sostanziva. La prima è che occorre tener presente il peso delle scelte del governo centrale nella distribuzione delle risorse a livello locale, quando si è in presenza in un sistema fortemente accentrato come quello italiano.

La seconda è che l'intraccio esistente fra politica ed economia vede il prevalere della prima nelle zone fuori delle aree di sviluppo.

RESUMÉ

Cet essai analyse les effets de la politique industrielle et de la distribution des investissements réalisée par les gouvernements italiens dans le Sud, surtout par l'intermédiaire de la Caisse pour le Sud.

Après brièvement reconstitué la stratégie de la Caisse dans les diverses phases de son travail, les auteurs soutiennent que des critères de choix non pas économiques mais politiques ont joué importance dans la distribution des investissements industriels dans le Sud. L'étude tend alors d'établir la relation entre la distribution spatiale des lignes d'intervention publique et le comportement politique des habitants des diverses zones.

Un échantillon de 534 communes a été pris en considération: la moitié de celles-ci appartiennent aux zones de développement ou aux groupes créés en 1957, l'autre moitié en est exclue. L'hypothèse est que la majeure partie des investissements ont été distribués là où majeure était la compétition entre la Dc et le Pci.

Dans la période 1951-61, dans les communes intéressées par les investissements (fussent-ils de grande, moyenne ou petite importance), on n'enregistre pas d'augmentation des votes en faveur de la Dc. Au contraire, il semble que ce soit le Pci qui a obtenu, bien que légèrement, plus de succès.

Dans la période 1961-71, les communes qui ont reçu le plus fort taux d'investissements enregistrent le soutien le plus bas en faveur de la DC. Au contraire, les communes qui n'ont pas reçu d'investissements ont été celles où les votes en faveur de la DC ont le plus augmenté (Tab. 2). Le soutien électoral au PCI reste stable dans les communes qui ont obtenu les investissements les plus élevés, et décroît dans les communes de la catégorie des investissements moyens (Tab. 3).

Il faut cependant distinguer des autres les communes qui ont reçu des investissements tout en n'étant pas incluses dans les zones de développement. Les Tab. 4 et 5 montrent la différence entre des communes qui ont reçu des investissements et sont comprises dans les zones de développement et des communes qui ont également reçu des investissements tout en n'étant pas comprises dans les zones de développement. Les résultats de la recherche montrent que: 1) les votes en faveur de la DC sont plus élevés dans toutes les catégories des communes non comprises dans les zones; 2) les votes en faveur du PCI sont plus bas dans toutes les communes non comprises dans les zones. Une seule exception. Les communes qui ont reçu des investissements moyens, mais se trouvent en dehors des zones, ont donné un appui majeur au PCI que leurs homologues à l'intérieur des zones.

Selon les auteurs, ces données démontrent que la Caisse a obéi à des critères politiques en concédant des investissements à des communes situées en dehors des zones, pour conserver un électoral déjà fidèle et pour l'élargir.

La comparaison entre deux types d'investissement, ceux *capital intensive* et ceux *labor intensive*, démontre ensuite comment les seconds ont été beaucoup plus abondants que les premiers. Eh bien, le soutien électoral en faveur de la DC est plus élevé dans les communes qui ont obtenu des interventions *seulement* du type *labor intensive*, tandis que le soutien électoral en faveur du PCI est plus élevé auprès des communes qui ont obtenu des interventions *seulement* du type *capital intensive*. Au contraire, dans ces dernières, les votes du PCI augmentent, tandis que ceux de la DC diminuent.

La Caisse a favorisé les communes avec des investissements du type *labor intensive* pour aider la politique des pots-de-vin des leaders politiques locaux. En effet les investissements s'avèrent très élevés justement dans les communes les moins habitées et les plus agricoles, et de traditionnelle influence démocrate-chrétienne.

Un nombre tout aussi élevé de communes a obtenu des investissements industriels élevés par rapport aux communes qui ont obtenu de bas investissements industriels.

Un autre aspect de la politique de la Caisse est celui d'être caractérisé en même temps par la concentration et par la dispersion. D'une part, le flux des investissements a été concentré dans peu de communes des zones (avec la création des « cathédrales dans le désert »), d'autre part, il a été dispersé dans de nombreuses communes en dehors des zones. Les conséquences ont été l'échec du décollage d'une industrie méridionale et la persistance de taux élevés de chômage. Le fait est que, une fois encore, dans la distribution des ressources ont prévalu sur les critères de rationalité économique des considérations d'ordre politique et de passe-droits.

L'étude se termine avec une considération méthodologique et une autre substantive. Selon la première, il faut tenir compte du poids des choix du gouvernement central dans la distribution des ressources au niveau local quand on est en présence d'un système fortement centralisé comme le système italien.

Selon la deuxième, l'enchevêtrement qui existe entre la politique et l'économie voit la prédominance de la première dans les régions situées en dehors des zones de développement.